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Abstract—This paper presents a novel approach to Demand
Side Management (DSM), using an “individualised” price policy,
where each end user receives a separate electricity pricing
scheme designed to incentivise demand management in order to
optimally manage flexible demands. These pricing schemes have
the objective of reducing the peaks in overall system demand
in such a way that the average electricity price each individual
user receives is non-discriminatory. It is shown in the paper
that this approach has a number of advantages and benefits
compared to traditional DSM approaches. The “demand aware
price policy” approach outlined in this paper exploits the knowl-
edge, or demand-awareness, obtained from advanced metering
infrastructure. The presented analysis includes a detailed case
study of an existing European distribution network where DSM
trial data was available from the residential end-users.
NOMENCLATURE
Indices and sets
S set of substation indices
s indices of substations (elements of S)
T set of time-slots indices
t indices of time-slots (elements of T )
U set of residential user indices
u indices of residential users (elements of U )
T tariff system
P set of individualised price policies
Parameters and Constants
dtu forecasted power demand of user u in time-slot t
d˜tu historical power demand of user u in time-slot t
dˆtu power demand of user u in time-slot t, as a response
to individualised price policies
P tS maximum power for substation s in time-slot t
Qu capacity of storage of user u
Ru power rate of storage of user u
Cu maximum power for user u, from energy contract
α multiplier for Cu, in order to guarantee minimum
low-tariff energy
bl residential users low price for buying energy
bh residential users high price for buying energy
β residential users price for selling energy from local
renewable sources
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Variables
btu state of charge of storage of user u in time-slot t
atu charge/discharge action on storage of user u in time-
slot t
∆t exceeding power at substation level
P tu maximum power for user u in time-slot t
ζu percentage of load shifting required for user u
ξ index of price policy non-discrimination
I. INTRODUCTION
THis paper presents a set of Demand Side Management(DSM) software services which were introduced in the
SmartHG project [1]. These services are designed to manage
residential end-user energy demand with two objectives: to
minimize energy costs for each individual user, and to assist
the Distribution System Operator (DSO) in managing network
constraints and optimising the operation of the distribution
system. This is achieved by exploiting demand awareness
as obtained from smart metering and other Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructure (AMI). One of the unique aspects of
the approach introduced in the SmartHG project is that the
price policies are “individualised”, e.g. each individual user
receives a separate electricity pricing scheme designed to
incetivise demand management in order to optimally manage
flexible demands. These pricing schemes are designed with the
primary objective of reducing the peaks in overall distribution
system demand, which has significant benefits for the network
and for the DSO. This is achieved in such a way that the
average electricity price each individual user receives is non-
discriminatory, and the pricing policy is designed to shape the
demand without reducing the overall demand volume, which
is undesirable from the DSO point of view.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses
previous work, Section III contains the problem formulation,
and Section IV outlines the methodology. Section V describes
the case study and results, and Section VI concludes.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
In light of the increasing penetrations of variable energy
resources, and the decreasing contribution from traditional
generation sources, i.e. large, controllable thermal generation
plant, a number of recent studies have identified a need for
new sources of flexibility in electricity networks, e.g., [2],
[3]. For several decades, network operators have used various
forms of DSM to improve the balancing of system supply and
demand and to reduce load peaks. Many of the practical DSM
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programmes implemented worldwide to date have focused on
large industrial consumers since these have demand of suffi-
cient volume to produce significant effects at the system level
(e.g., [4], [5]). However, with the introduction of smart meter-
ing and time-varying electricity rates for individual customers,
new opportunities are being created for small electricity users
to participate in demand side services. Recently, much research
has focused on DSM in the residential sector [6]–[13].
Many existing DSM programmes use direct load control,
where the network operator is able to directly actuate large
industrial loads according to the needs of the network [4],
[5], and the exact terms of the DSM contract are agreed
beforehand. While direct load control may be suitable for cer-
tain industrial users, it has technical and practical difficulties
in the context of residential users, where direct actuation of
loads is typically considered an invasion of user privacy and
comfort. In addition, direct load control may require large
investments in order to provide additional communication
and control technology for each user. Most residential DSM
schemes instead rely on the user response to a electricity price
signal to produce the required outcome, e.g., [6], [7], [9]–[14].
Recent studies carried out in Ireland [15] and in Den-
mark [16], have tested the response of residential users to
various Time of Usage (ToU) electricity pricing schemes, in
order to quantify their potential to offer DSM services. It
was shown in these trials that a significant amount of the
residential demand (up to 19% in [16]) could be shifted away
from the peak hour if appropriate economic incentives are
applied. In order to achieve the volumes of demand required to
participate in the electricity market, and to make a significant
contribution to system-level energy balancing, a means of
combining and coordinating DSM actions from many highly-
distributed users is required. Several approaches for this have
been proposed, such as the “aggregator” [17] and “virtual
power plant” concepts [18], [19].
One of the drawbacks of traditional approaches to DSM,
where all users are subject to the same price (global price
policy), is that the peak-shifting schemes may result in un-
desirable “rebound” effects, e.g. simply shifting the demand
peaks from the peak hour to the off-peak hours, and creating
new demand peaks, or “rebound peaks” [11]–[13]. The authors
in [11] and [12] discuss automated DSM algorithms designed
to schedule flexible residential user loads. It is demonstrated
that this can produce rebound peaks, and it is concluded in [11]
that DSM algorithms need to be studied for large numbers of
devices and users, and that DSM schemes need to be designed
with the objective of flattening the overall electricity usage in
order to avoid these issues.
Exposing electricity end users to wholesale market prices
(real-time pricing) has the drawback that demand may be
shifted to hours with low electricity price, which can “lead
to a higher peak electricity price and peak-to-average ratio
during the low price time”, according to [13]. There is a
significant challenge in ensuring that such real-time prices do
not cause physical or market instabilities [20], and it has been
shown that multiple, uncoordinated responses to frequently
changing prices can cause increased volatility, and potentially
grid instability [21]–[23].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Individualised User Price Policies
A real-world example of the rebound effect is shown below,
using recorded data from a residential DSM study carried out
by a Danish DSO [16]. In this study, residential users were
given a time-varying price policy with three distinct pricing
periods, designed to test the flexibility of residential demand
to economic peak-shifting incentives. The values are provided
below in Danish Krone (DKK):
• Day: 1.50 DKK / kWh (06:00-17:00)
• Peak: 8.00 DKK / kWh (17:00-20:00)
• Night: 0.00 DKK / kWh (20:00-06:00)
This electricity pricing scheme provided strong incentives
for household users and assessed the potential for residential
users to shift their demand away from the peak cooking hours
(17:00-20:00) to the night period (20:00-06:00) where the
price is zero1.
The above price policy was applied to a “Test group” of
350 households, with a “Reference group” of 349 households2
receiving a fixed price of 2.25 DKK / kWh at all hours
during the day (as per the standard flat tariff residential pricing
scheme used in Denmark). The study was carried out over a
full year from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014. The
results showed that, with the above price incentives, a signif-
icant amount of residential demand (up to 19%) was shifted
away from the peak hours, compared to the reference group.
The price incentives had little effect on the overall demand
consumption, i.e. the total volume of consumption remained
almost constant, only the times at which consumption occurred
were influenced by the pricing scheme.
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Fig. 1. Sample of the results from the Danish study, showing peak shifting
in the Test group compared to the Reference group during January 2014 [16].
Fig. 1 shows a sample of the results from the Danish
study [16] for the month January 2014. All months of the
year showed a similar pattern, but the amount of demand shift
from the peak hour was largest during the winter months.
The results in Fig. 1 are a good example of the “rebound
peak” effects which can result from global ToU price policies.
1It could be argued that this is a rather extreme pricing policy and that the
zero night time price is more likely to cause rebound peaks than a pricing
scheme with, for example, a non-zero night-time price. However, the results
of this study are insightful in that they demonstrate that significant residential
demand-shifting is possible with appropriate financial incentives, and these
results provide real data on user responses to price signals for the subsequent
analysis in the paper.
2The SEAS-NVE study was originally designed with 350 test and 350
reference householders, but data was unavailable for one of the reference
group households; hence this group only has 349 households.
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There is a significant increase in demand at the beginning
of the off-peak period for the “Test group”, and this pricing
scheme has created a new demand peak at 21:00, which is even
larger than the demand peak in the “Reference group”, Fig. 1.
These effects are undesirable, since typical DSM objectives
are to smooth the load profile, increase the load factor, and
reduce demand peaks.
An alternative solution to the “global” price policy, where
all users (or at least all users in the same sector), receive
the same price incentives is proposed in this paper. Instead,
an “individualised” price policy is provided to each user,
using the Demand-Aware Price Policy (DAPP) computational
service outlined in Section IV. This is designed to maximise
the benefits of demand response actions for both the user
and the DSO. The effects on network operation and the
potential benefits to the DSO in using such an individualised
price policy are evaluated using the scenarios presented in
Section V.
Even with strong ToU price incentives for demand-shifting,
such as those used in the SEAS-NVE study [16]), the amount
of demand flexibility from residential appliances is limited.
Energy Storage Systems (ESS) offer much greater possibil-
ities for demand flexibility. It is widely expected that the
cost of such technologies will continue to decrease, making
storage accessible to a wide range of users, including domestic
consumers. Moreover, Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) can
significantly alter the demand profiles, and create critical
congestions in the distribution network if their charging is not
managed appropriately [24], [25]. Accordingly, this paper also
analyses scenarios where the residential homes are equipped
with PEVs and ESS, in order to examine potential future
scenarios with greater user flexibility in response to ToU
pricing.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Overview
The proposed methodology is based on two integrated soft-
ware services, which are described schematically in Fig. 2. The
Electricity Distribution Network Virtual Tomography (EVT)
service is aimed at assisting the DSO in the operation and
management of the distribution networks. The EVT service
uses available measurements from Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) and smart metering/AMI systems
to estimate the network state in real-time using a Weighted
Least Squares (WLS) state estimator, and also to carry out
network analysis ahead of time, as described in [26], [27]. This
detects possible violations of network constraints, and raises
warnings and alarms to the DSO accordingly. The results of
the state estimation and network analysis carried out in the
EVT can be used to make operational constraints, limiting
the demand drawn at some or all substations s within the
distribution network at times of peak demand. This could be
motivated by economic reasons (e.g. in order to reduce the
cost for the DSO of buying energy from the market at times
of peak electricity price), by technical reasons (in order to
reduce overloading of network components during times of
peak demand, or during periods when the system is weakened
due to line/transformer maintenance or other outages).
The second service, DAPP, is designed to redistribute the
power demand (load shifting) so that the constraints on the
substations s are fulfilled. This is done by computing, for each
residential home u connected to s, an individualised suggested
power profile Pu (i.e. different users may get different power
profiles), so that if all users follow their power profile then the
operational constraints on s, as suggested by EVT, are met.
Each user u is motivated to follow the suggested power profile
Pu by an individualised price policy based on Pu. Proposing
individualised price policies avoids the problem of rebound
peaks, i.e. where the demand peaks are simply shifted through
the day, which may violate operational constraints.
Fig. 2. The proposed services architecture.
B. The DAPP Service
In this section, the DAPP service is described. In order to
understand how DAPP works, we first define how we model
residential users flexibility (Section IV-B1). Then, we outline
the DAPP service input-output behaviour (Section IV-B2).
Third, we formally define one of the main requirements for the
DAPP service, i.e., the fact that resulting individualised price
policies must be non-discriminatory (Section IV-B3). Finally,
we describe the algorithm underlying the DAPP service (Sec-
tion IV-B4) and we prove that it outputs non-discriminatory
price policies (Section IV-B5).
The notation used in the DAPP service is as follows: a time-
slots set T is a finite set of contiguous time-slots, all having the
same duration τ (in minutes). Without loss of generality, we
will assume T to contain time-slot indices. A power profile
is a function P : T → R, where we write P t for P (t). A
power profile P1 follows a power profile P2 if and only if
P1(t) ≤ P
t
2 for all t ∈ T . The area of a power profile P on T
is τ
∑
t∈T P
t, i.e., the overall energy yielded by P . Finally, a
Linear Programming (LP) problem is a minimisation problem
over a set of linear inequalities (constraints) on real variables.
1) Residential User Flexibility Model: In our approach,
each residential user u is provided, with a given periodicity
(every day in our experiments), with an individualised price
policy to be followed. Such price policy is defined on the
basis of an individualised power profile Pu. The resulting tariff
for u, which we call DAPP tariff, is based on two prices for
energy, the high price and the low price: if user u needs power
d˜tu in time-slot t, then u will pay the low price if d˜
t
u ≤ P
t
u, and
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Fig. 3. Historical demand compared to power profile output by DAPP for a
single home on a given day in our evaluation scenario.
the high tariff otherwise. As a consequence, we call low tariff
area the area of Pu on T . Note that the DAPP tariff is: (i)
Inclining Block Rate (IBR) (two prices are used depending on
user power demand); (ii) ToU (Pu varies with time); and (iii)
individualised (Pu varies with the user too). As an example,
Fig. 3 shows the individualised power profile Pu (red curve)
together with the actual power demand du (green curve) on
the 6th of September 2012 for a selected user u connected to
a selected substation s in the reference scenario we will use
for our experimental evaluation (see Section V). In the time-
slot t1 from 16:00 to 17:00, the user is outside the low tariff
area (i.e., dt1u > P
t1
u ), thus the high tariff is applied, whilst in
the preceding time-slot t2 the low tariff is applied. In order to
stay inside the low tariff area also in t1, the user should be
flexible and, as an example, move approximately 0.3 kW of
power demand (i.e., dt1u − P
t1
u ) from t1 to t2 (load shifting).
In this section, we want to provide a mathematical model
for user flexibility, based on the one in [14], in order to show
the effectiveness of the DAPP-based methodology in scenarios
in which the flexibility of each user may vary. To this aim,
we proceed as follows. We model flexibility of a residential
user u by means of a load shifting capability. Such capability
may be either “physical”, i.e., user u has a battery installed at
home, or “virtual”, i.e., user u has to shift the loads of other
appliances, in order to stay inside the low tariff area.
Given this, we model the load shifting capability, both in
the physical and in the virtual case, as an ESS: the power rate
of the ESS defines a bound on load shifting in each time-slot,
whilst the capacity of the ESS gives a bound on the summation
of consecutive load shifts. Namely, in our mathematical model,
the flexibility of u is a pair (Qu, Ru), where Qu is the ESS
capacity (i.e., the maximum energy which may be stored, in
kWh) and Ru is the ESS power rate (i.e., the maximum power
in kW which may be used from or saved into the ESS in a
given time-slot). In the example of Fig. 3, in order to perform
the above described load shifting, it is sufficient to have Qu =
0.3 kWh and Ru = 0.3 kW. Since the user has to move 0.3 kW
in one hour, from time-slot t1 to time-slot t2, the ESS must be
charged by 0.3 kW in time-slot t1 and discharged by 0.3 kW in
time-slot t2. Both actions require at least Qu = 0.3 kWh and
Ru = 0.3 kW. Of course, the ESS modelling the load shifting
capability should have been charged during time-slot t2 (from
15:00 to 16:00, where the user needs less energy than the one
allowed in low tariff), and then discharged during time-slot
t1 (from 16:00 to 17:00, where instead the user needs more
energy than the one allowed in low tariff). Instead, in order
to be able to stay in the low tariff area of Fig. 3 for all the
displayed 9 hours (from 12:00 to 21:00), the user flexibility
required is Qu = 1 kWh, with a power rate Ru = 1 kW, since
the user is 1kW outside the low tariff area in the time-slot from
12:00 to 13:00. A possible shifted demand with respect to a (1
kWh, 1 kW) flexibility, which is always inside the low tariff
area, is shown in the blue curve in Fig. 3. In the following, we
will call charge/discharge plan a power profile au returning,
for each time-slot t, the action taken on a ESS of capacity
Qu and power rate Ru. Namely, if a
t
u ≥ 0, then the ESS is
charged by atu kW (in Fig. 3 this happens, e.g., from 15:00 to
16:00). Otherwise, if atu < 0, then the ESS is discharged by
atu kW (in Fig. 3 this happens, e.g., from 12:00 to 13:00). Of
course, if atu = 0 no loads are shifted (in Fig. 3 this happens,
e.g., from 13:00 to 14:00).
2) DAPP Input and Output: We now describe in detail
input and output for our DAPP algorithm (for a high-level
view, see Fig. 4). Namely, DAPP requires the following input:
1) a set of users U connected to a substation s;
2) a time-slots set T (typically with a time span one day in
the future);
3) the desired power profile Ps (in kW) on T for the
substation s, as decided by the DSO on the basis of EVT
output;
4) three per-unit tariffs bl ≤ bh, β ∈ R
+ coming from the
energy retailer: respectively, the low (buy) price, the high
(buy) price, and the sell price for energy;
5) for each u ∈ U , a forecast du for the power profile of
u in T (this may be computed on the basis of d˜u, i.e.,
of the power profile of u in the days preceding T using,
e.g., [28]);
6) for each user u ∈ U , the maximum power (in kW) Cu ∈
R supported by the home main, as defined in the energy
contract for electricity consumption and production (e.g.,
3 or 6 kW);
7) for each user u ∈ U , the flexibility of u as a pair (Ru, Qu)
(see Sect. IV-B1);
8) the minimum energy (in kWh) that must be contained
in the resulting low tariff area of each user u, as a
coefficient α multiplying the user energy contract Cu. As
an example, if α = 2 and the maximum power supported
by home u main is 6 kW, then the low tariff area of u
must contain at least 12 kWh on all period T . In our
experiments, we always use α = 1.
The output of DAPP is a set of individualised power profiles
Pu on T , for each residential user u ∈ U . Note that each Pu
defines a low tariff area. Namely, the DAPP (output) tariff,
for a given user u, is defined to incentivise the user to follow
the output power profile region as follows: i) if u is producing
energy, then the sell price β is applied; ii) if u is consuming
energy, then either the low price bl or the high price bh are
applied, depending on the power profile of u following Pu or
not, respectively.
3) Non-Discriminatory Price Policies: Intuitively, in order
to have residential users actually agreeing on paying bills
based on individual price policies, it is necessary that such
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price policies are non-discriminatory. This is also important
for the DSO and/or the energy retailer, as releasing discrim-
inatory price policies would decrease the number of users
accepting the price schema. In our context, we informally state
that a set of individualised price policies is non-discriminatory
if and only if all residential users have the same opportunities
to always pay the low tariff, i.e., if individualised price
policies, in the same period of time, are all at the same relative
distance from each user’s habits. The proposed DAPP price
policies are designed to always be non-discriminatory, even in
the case that users do not perform load shifting in order to
follow the suggested load profile (see the discussion on the
robustness of the DAPP price policies in Section V-C).
We formally define this notion as follows. First of all, we
define a tariff system T as a triple T = (bl, bh, β,P), where
bl, bh, β ∈ R
+ are, respectively, the low price and the high
price for buying energy and the price for selling energy, as
decided by the energy retailer, whilst P = {Pu | u ∈ U} is
the set of individualised price policies. Since prices bl, bh, β
are equal for all residential users, they are non-discriminatory
by construction. As for P , the following holds. If the power
demand of a user u, as a response to an individualised price
policy Pu, is dˆ
t
u on a given time-slot t, then u will pay
blmin{P
t
u, dˆ
t
u}+bhmax{dˆ
t
u−P
t
u, 0} (here, we do not consider
the case in which dˆtu < 0, as production is always paid with
the same price β). Since our goal is to show that all users
must have the same opportunity to stay inside the low tariff
area, we have to focus on max{dˆtu−P
t
u, 0}, which is the load
shifting which is required by user u in order to stay inside
the low tariff area. Intuitively, if Pu forces user u to perform
load shifting in the same way Pu′ does for u
′ (for any pair
u, u′ ∈ U ), then P is non-discriminatory.
In order to formally define this concept, we define, for each
user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T , the load shifting required by
u in t as:
ζtu =
max{dˆtu − P
t
u, 0}
dˆtu
(1)
That is, the load shifting required by a user is the percentage
of power (with respect to the historical demand) which must
be shifted to keep the resulting demand inside the low tariff
area. Given the definition of required load shifting, we say that
a tariff system T is r−non-discriminatory if:
ξ = stddevu∈Uavgt∈T ζ
t
u ≤ r (2)
where, for any (finite) set V , we have
avgv∈V ψ(v) = µψ =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
ψ(v) (3)
and
stddevv∈V ϕ(v) =
√
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
(ϕ(v) − µϕ)
2
(4)
As an example, T is 0.1-non-discriminatory if the standard
deviation of the set of averaged load shifts is below 10%
(which is a reasonable threshold in our present paper). This
Fig. 4. DAPP input and output on a single DSO substation.
allows us to measure how much the DAPP price policies
are non-discriminatory, including the case where users do not
follow the suggested power profiles (see Section V-C).
Finally, we note that estimating the flexibility of each user
is very important in order to enable DAPP to output non-
discriminatory price policies. To this aim, in our experiments,
we compute the capacity of the flexibility of each residential
user u as the average on all power variations between consec-
utive time-slots in the historical power demand of u. As for
power rate, we fix it as the typical power rate for ESSs, i.e.,
2kW. That is, for all u ∈ U , if the power profile of u from
the available history T˜ is d˜u, the flexibility of u is defined as
follows:
(Qu, Ru) = (τavgt∈T˜ |d˜
t+1
u − d˜
t
u|, 2) (5)
In this way, we assume u to be able to shift the demand of
u not more than u already does in the historical records.
4) DAPP Algorithm: DAPP algorithm consists in the fol-
lowing steps:
1) set up LP problem L;
2) solve L via an LP solver (CPLEX in our case);
3) extract the required output from the solution of L.
In the following, we describe the mathematical formulation
of the LP problem L. To this aim, first of all we list all
3|U ||T |+ |T | decision variables involved.
• For each user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T , a decision
variable P tu, modelling the upper bound (in kW) of the
low tariff area of user u in time-slot t.
• For each user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T , a decision
variable btu, modelling the state of charge (in kWh) of
the load shifting capability of user u in time-slot t.
• For each user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T , a decision
variable atu, modelling a charge/discharge plan, i.e., the
charge (if positive) or the discharge (if negative) action
(in kW) decided by user u in time-slot t in order to
stay within the low tariff area. Note that, in our problem
formulation, we only consider fixed load shifting capabil-
ities, and do not try to compute the charging/discharging
of “mobile” battery appliances such as PEVs. In our
experiments, we consider recharging of PEVs as an
additional load (that is, residential homes with a Plug-
in Electric Vehicle(s) (PEV) have higher power demand).
• For each time-slot t ∈ T , a decision variable ∆t,
modelling the aggregated user demand (in kW) which
exceeds substation desired power profile in t.
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Then, we describe all 2|U |+ 2|T |+ 6|U ||T | constraints in
L, involving the above defined decision variables and input
values described in Section IV-B2.
Minimise
∑
t∈T
∆t (6)
bt1u = b
t|T |
u =
Qu
2
: ∀u ∈ U (7)
bt+1u = b
t
u +
τ
60
atu : ∀u ∈ U, t ∈ T (8)
atu ≥ min{−d
t
u, 0} : ∀u ∈ U, t ∈ T (9)
atu + d
t
u ≤ P
t
u : ∀u ∈ U, t ∈ T (10)∑
t∈T
P tu ≥
60
τ
αCu : ∀u ∈ U (11)
∑
u∈U
P tu ≤ P
t
s +∆
t : ∀t ∈ T (12)
0 ≤ P tu ≤ Cu : ∀u ∈ U, t ∈ T (13)
0 ≤ btu ≤ Qu : ∀u ∈ U, t ∈ T (14)
−Ru ≤ a
t
u ≤ Ru : ∀u ∈ U, t ∈ T (15)
∆t ≥ 0 : ∀t ∈ T (16)
• Constraint (7): for each user u ∈ U , the state of charge
at the beginning of T and at the end of T must be both
equal to half of user flexibility.
• Constraint (8): for each user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T ,
the ESS modelling flexibility of u behaves like a battery,
i.e., the action taken at time-slot t effects state of charge
at time t+ 1.
• Constraint (9): for each user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T ,
the ESS modelling flexibility of u cannot be used to inject
power into the grid, i.e., it may be discharged only up to
the current power consumption.
• Constraint (10): for each user u ∈ U and time-slot t ∈ T ,
the power resulting from applying the ESS action to the
current demand must be below the price policy upper
bound. This constraint ensures that DAPP will output
non-discriminatory price policies (see Section IV-B3).
This is formally proved in Proposition 1.
• Constraint (11): for each user u ∈ U , the resulting low
tariff area for u must contain at least αCu kWh on all T .
This avoids reduction of the overall demand volume.
• Constraint (12) and objective function (6): for each time-
slot t ∈ T , if all users synchronize and use the maximum
energy allowed in their low tariff areas, the resulting
aggregated demand must be below the substation desired
threshold, plus an offset to be minimised (in order to
achieve peak shaving).
• Finally, the remaining constraints (13)-(16) define the
upper and lower bounds for each decision variable. Note
that, since we minimise
∑
t∈T ∆
t, we simply require
each ∆t to be non-negative.
The final output of DAPP is obtained by retrieving the
values of P tu from the solution returned by the LP solver.
Note that the solution returned by the LP solver also contains
a charge/discharge plan for each user u ∈ U (using values of
atu decision variables). This allows us to define, for each user
u ∈ U , the DAPP collaborative power profile of u cu : T → R
as the result of applying the charge/discharge plan au to the
input forecasted profile du, i.e., for all t ∈ T
ctu = d
t
u + a
t
u (17)
Note that each collaborative power profile is always inside
the low tariff area defined by Constraint 10.
5) DAPP Output Price Policies Are Non-Discriminatory:
In this section, we formally prove that the individualised
price policies output by our DAPP service are indeed non-
discriminatory as wanted, if the forecasting is precise.
Proposition 1. Let d˜tu be the historical power demand of user
u ∈ U in time-slot t ∈ T , and let dtu be the forecast of
d˜tu given in input to DAPP. If the forecasting error is 0, i.e.,
dtu − d˜
t
u = 0, then the price policies output by DAPP are
0−non-discriminatory.
Proof. If the relative forecasting error is 0 then, for each user
u ∈ U , dtu = d˜
t
u. Let us assume that, for each user u ∈ U , the
collaborative power profile cu output by DAPP is the actual
response of u to the individualised price policy Pu output by
DAPP for u. Hence, dˆtu = c
t
u = d
t
u+ a
t
u for all t ∈ T, u ∈ U .
By Constraint 10, we have that dˆtu ≤ P
t
u, thus avgt∈T ζ
t
u = 0
for all u ∈ U which implies ξ = stddevu∈Uavgt∈T ζ
t
u ≤ r for
each r ≥ 0.
Note that, in the general case, for a given user u ∈ U ,
cu is not the only possible choice for dˆu in order to always
stay inside the low tariff area of u. However, the proof given
above works for any dˆu = c
′
u 6= cu, provided that c
t
u
′
=
dtu + a
t
u
′
and that au
′ fulfils Constraints (8), (9), (10), (14)
and (15). In particular, since Constraint (10) is satisfied, the
thesis holds.
As for the case in which the forecasting error is non-
zero, Section V-C shows the results of applying (2) to our
experimental scenarios, by considering the worst case in which
the users do not respond to the individualised price policies
(i.e., dˆtu = d˜
t
u for all u ∈ U, t ∈ T ). This will show that
the output of DAPP is robust with respect to errors in the
input forecasted demand. In the proposed scheme, users are
motivated to stay inside the low tariff area by the low energy
price provided by DAPP individualised price policies. It should
be noted that DAPP does not directly provide an incentive
to users to increase their flexibility, e.g., by installing ESS.
However, users with high flexibility play an important role in
enabling load shifting, which in turn allows DAPP to return a
smaller value for the upper bound (Pu) for the low tariff area of
such users. Hence, the aggregated user demand which exceeds
the substation desired power profile will be smaller (i.e., the
value of the objective function of the LP problem described
in Section IV-B4 is smaller). Since this is a benefit for the
DSO, it will be in the DSOs interest to provide an economic
incentive for users willing to increase their flexibility.
C. Implementation Issues
In order to implement the DAPP load shifting, it was
assumed that each user’s battery and/or controllable appliances
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are controlled automatically using a home energy management
system, whose objective is to minimise the user’s energy bill,
by staying inside the low tariff area as much as possible. In the
SmartHG project [1] (on which the presented paper is based),
a test-bed was developed where residential users had Home
Area Networks (HANs) with load sensors and actuators and
a corresponding communication infrastructure. This provided
a means of implementing the individualised price policies.
The SmartHG test bed and communication infrastructure are
outlined in more detail in [29]. A full evaluation of this home
energy management system is out of the scope of this paper,
which is devoted to computational services at the network
level.
However, the individualised pricing schemes proposed in
this paper could in theoretically be implemented using any
home energy management system, such as those already
proposed the literature (e.g. [12], [13]), or through any com-
bination of direct load control of home appliances, or indirect
user responses to price signals. One of the advantages of
the proposed approach is that the price signal user sees is
very simple: in any given hour receive either the low or
the high tariff. However, the proposed demand management
approach is likely to be more effective in cases where there is
a home energy management system, which can automatically
implement the demand response, rather than depending on
an indirect or manual user response to the price signal. The
communication hardware cost of implementing individualised
price policies is expected to be low, since it is assumed
that all users already have smart meters installed, and users
can receive individual rather than global prices without any
hardware modifications.
V. CASE STUDY AND RESULTS
A. Base Case
The case study network used in this paper is taken from the
European Commission project “SmartHG” [1]. This network is
a suburban/rural 10kV system with a weakly-meshed structure.
A reduced version of the network schematic diagram is shown
in Fig. 5. The network has a peak demand of 3.2 MW
(with the largest demands occurring in winter), and serves
approximately 1,600 customers. There are 46 MV nodes in
the network, where each MV node corresponds to a secondary
transformer substation (10:0.4 kV). Of these 46 secondary sub-
stations, 30 serve suburban/rural residential customers (77%
of the total network demand), and the remaining 16 MV sub-
stations serve demand comprising of factory, district heating
and water pumping loads. It was assumed that price policies
outlined in Section IV only affect the residential demands.
Measurements of power consumption were recorded at each
substation at hourly intervals over the course of a two year
period from September 2012 to September 2014, in the form
of aggregated smart meter measurements. In addition, smart
meter data was available from selected individual users in the
network.
This data was used to create the reference scenario called
“Base Case” which shows the results calculated using the
actual recorded data from the network for the two-year pe-
riod from September 2012 to September 2014. The results
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Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of MV distribution network case study.
calculated using the actual recorded data from the network for
the two-year period from September 2012 to September 2014.
All users received a fixed (i.e., flat) electricity price during
this period.
B. Test Scenarios
The test scenarios described below and in Table I are
extensions of the Base Case. Scenarios 1 and 2 show the results
of simulations designed to examine the effects of both “global”
and “individualised” price policies:
• Scenario 1a All residential users in the case study
network receive the same ToU price designed to shift
demand away from the peak hours (e.g. a “global” price
policy). Households do not have energy storage or PEV.
• Scenario 1b All residential users receive the individu-
alised ToU price policy proposed by the DAPP service.
Households do not have energy storage or PEV.
• Scenario 2a All users receive the same “global” ToU
price policy designed to shift demand away from the peak
hours. 50% of the households (randomly-selected) have
PEV (with 16 kWh capacity and 13 kW power rate). The
PEV data used in this study was taken from actual vehicle
charging data from the “Test-an-EV” project [30].
• Scenario 2b All residential users receive the individu-
alised ToU price policy proposed by the DAPP service.
50% of the households have a PEV as in Scenario 2a, and
all households are equipped with energy storage in the
form of a PowerWall battery [31] (with 7 kWh capacity
and 2 kW power rate).
TABLE I
SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY
Scenario Price policy PEV ESS
Base Case flat rate No No
1a global No No
1b indiv No No
2a global 50% 100%
2b indiv 50% 100%
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Fig. 6. Load shifing required by users connected to the substation with most
connected houses in Scenario 1b.
C. Robustness of Non-Discrimination in DAPP Price Policies
In this section we show that the individualised price policies
output by DAPP for each residential user are indeed non-
discriminatory (see Section IV-B3) in a robust way. Proposi-
tion 1 only holds if the forecast has no errors. In real applica-
tions, there will always be an error in power forecasting, thus
we want to show that the price policies output by DAPP are
r−non-discriminatory with a very low r, e.g., r = 0.1. To this
aim, we compute ξ from (2) with dˆtu = d˜
t
u, i.e., when there is
no response to the individualised price policies (which implies
that the response coincides with the historical demand). This
allows us to investigate the worst case scenario and to show
that, even if each user does not perform load shifting at all
(i.e., atu = 0 for all u ∈ U, t ∈ T ), the price policies output by
DAPP are 0.1−non-discriminatory. This proves robustness of
DAPP output price policies, as they are not strongly dependent
on the power demand forecasting.
Considering Scenarios 1b and 2b (the only ones involving
DAPP output), we obtain the following results for the non-
discrimination index ξ in (2):
Scenario 1b : 2.08%;
Scenario 2b : 5.32%
As a result, we have that in both our scenarios the in-
dividualised price policies output by DAPP are indeed 0.1-
non-discriminatory (and thus non-discriminatory), as required.
Finally, in order to show an interesting example of load
shifting requirements, Fig. 6 depicts the load shifting required
by all 136 houses connected to the substation with highest
number of connected users in our Scenario 1b. Moreover,
Fig. 6 also shows the mean of the load shifting of all 136
houses, and the standard deviation from this mean. As a
result, we have that the standard deviation of the required
load shifting on these 136 houses is less than 2%. On the other
hand, the standard deviation σ of the total energy demand (i.e.,
accumulated on the whole period of two years) for the 136
houses in this example is 22% of the maximum total energy
demand. This shows that, even in a scenario in which power
demands have an high variance among users, the price policies
output by DAPP are 0.02−non-discriminatory.
D. Simulated Impacts of Price Policies on Network Demand
Profiles and Load Factor
1) Impact on Demand Profiles: This section shows the
impact on load profiles at each substation calculated by
simulation of each of the above scenarios. Figures 7a and 7b
show a sample of the load profiles for the Base Case, Scenario
1a and Scenario 1b. These are shown for the Winter Peak and
Summer Minimum demand cases respectively.
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Fig. 7. Scenario 1 - Time series of aggregate residential demand profiles
showing Base Case, global price policy (Scenario 1a), and individualised price
policy (Scenario 1b) for: a) Winter Peak; b) Summer Minimum.
It can be seen from Fig. 7 that the global price policy
(dashed line, Scenario 1a) results in a rebound demand peak
similar to that recorded in Fig. 1, Section I and [16]. For the
individual price policy case (dotted line, Scenario 1b, Fig. 7b),
the demand peaks are much reduced due to the effect of the
DAPP algorithm. This significantly improves the load factor
(the ratio of average to maximum load).
For Scenario 2 (Fig. 8), the overall demand is increased due
to the influence of PEV load, with larger peaks in the evening
hours. The global price policy results show a large demand
rebound at hours 20:00 - 22:00 (dashed lines, Scenario 2a).
The proposed individual price policy results in a much flatter
demand profile (dotted lines, Scenario 2b in Fig. 7b).
2) Impact on Aggregate Load Factor: The aggregate load
factors, calculated across all residential customers, are pro-
vided in Tables II and III. These were calculated for typical
“Winter Peak” and “Summer Minimum” days, and also for
the “Overall” case, which calculates the total load factor over
the two years of the simulation.
These results reflect the pattern shown in Fig. 1, Section III
and in the load profile results in Figs. 7-8. It can be seen in
that the global price policy (Scenarios 1a and 2a) increases
the overall magnitude of the demand peaks and reduces the
demand middle of the day, which produces lower load factors
than in the Base Case. In contrast, the individualised price
policy flattens the demand profiles and increases load factors
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Fig. 8. Scenario 2 - Time series of aggregate residential demand profiles
showing Base Case, global price policy (Scenario 2a), and individualised price
policy (Scenario 2b) for: a) Winter Peak; b) Summer Minimum.
(Scenarios1b and 2b).
TABLE II
SCENARIO 1 AGGREGATED LOAD FACTORS
Load Factor Base Case Scenario 1a Scenario 1b
Winter Peak 0.7054 0.6164 0.8017
Summer Min 0.6205 0.5794 0.6257
Overall 0.3327 0.2897 0.3933
The load factors in the “Overall” case (final rows of
Tables II and III are much lower than the Winter Peak/Summer
Minimum day cases, since the “Overall” values represent the
average load factor calculated over the entire two year period,
considering all of the seasonal variations during this time.
The results in Tables II and III clearly show the poten-
tial benefits of applying the proposed individualised pricing
scheme. In Scenario 1 there is an overall annual load factor
improvement compared to the Base Case by using DAPP
of 15.4%, and in Scenario 2, the corresponding figure is
27.2 %. It is also shown that the amount of load flattening
varies throughout the course of the year, and in the Summer
Minimum day in Scenario 1, the improvement in load factor
compared to the Base Case is not significant (less than 1 %).
However, in Scenario 2b, the corresponding load factor im-
provement is 18.7%. This suggests that the benefits of applying
an individualised are likely to be much more significant in
networks with PEV and ESS.
This simulated increase in load factors due to the application
of individualised price policies would have clear benefits
for the DSO. This would reduce the amount of energy to
be purchased from the wholesale market during expensive
peak hours, and the flatter load profiles would result in less
instances where network is overloaded, potentially reducing
network maintenance and upgrade costs and allowing deferral
TABLE III
SCENARIO 2 AGGREGATED LOAD FACTORS
Load Factor Base Case Scenario 2a Scenario 2b
Winter Peak 0.7116 0.6176 0.8124
Summer Min 0.5927 0.5280 0.7038
Overall 0.3471 0.3084 0.4415
of network investments. In the following section, some of
the impacts of the proposed price policies on the distribution
network operation are examined in more detail.
E. Simulated Network Impacts of Price Policies
1) Impact on Network Power Flows: The impacts on power
flows throughout the MV network is shown in Fig. 9 for
Scenarios 1 and 2, using the maximum thermal MVA flow
expressed as a percentage of the line rating. The thermal MVA
flow is calculated for all of lines and transformers in the MV
distribution network (Fig. 5), and the maximum value for each
day in the 2-year period is shown. From both Figs. 9a and 9b,
it is clear that the global price policy (Scenario 1a and 2a,
dashed lines) results in heavier line loading values, whereas the
individualised price policy (Scenario 1b and 2b, dotted lines)
results in reduced line loading. This result is expected, since it
is shown in Section V-D2 that the individualised price policy
reduces the magnitude of the demand peaks and improves
the load factor. Table IV shows the results for the number
of overloads (MVA flow >100% of line rating) in each case.
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Fig. 9. Daily maximum loading as a percentage of the line limits for: a)
Scenario 1; b) Scenario 2.
2) Impact on Network Voltages: The number of low voltage
violations in the distribution network case study are sum-
marised in Table V. Any voltages lower than 0.97 p.u.3 were
3MV network voltage limits are set tighter than the typical statutory voltage
limits of 1.1 - 0.9 p.u., since it is expected that there will be significant further
voltage drops on the LV feeders downstream of the MV substations in Fig. 5
(LV feeders are not shown in the schematic), particularly along longer lines.
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF LINE THERMAL MVA LIMIT VIOLATIONS
No. Overloads
(> 100 %)
Base Case
Global
Price Policy
Individual
Price Policy
Scenario 1 3 6 0
Scenario 2 3 18 2
recorded as voltage violations. High voltage events are not
considered in the study, nor are events involving network
faults and planned/unplanned outages, which would affect
the voltage profiles. These results show that several voltage
violations occur in both the Base Case and Scenario 1a and 2a
(global price policy) cases. These low voltages occur during
time of peak loading, in the parts of the network with the
greatest electrical distance from the primary substation. In the
individual price policy simulations, Scenario 1b and 2b, there
were no violations, due to the reductions in peak loading.
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF LOW VOLTAGE VIOLATIONS
No. Low Voltages
(> 0.97 p.u.)
Base Case
Global
Price Policy
Individual
Price Policy
Scenario 1 2 2 0
Scenario 2 2 2 0
3) Impact on Network Line Losses: The analysis of the total
losses in the MV test case network showed some differences
in network losses as a results of applying the global and
individualised price policy scenarios:
• Scenario 1: Typical cumulative losses in the MV network
are 142 MWh/year and 68 MVAr/year. The individualised
price policy produced 1.5 - 1.6% lower line losses com-
pared to the global price policy case.
• Scenario 2: Typical cumulative losses in the MV network
162 MWh/year and 78 MVAr/year. The individualised
price policy had 2.2 - 2.3% lower line losses.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a novel approach to DSM, using
an “individualised” price policy, which incentivises users to
optimally manage flexible demands. The primary objective is
to reduce peaks in the overall distribution system demand, in
such a way that the average price received by each end user is
non-discriminatory. This approach is compared to traditional
“global” price policy schemes, where all users (or a large
number of users in the same network region or associated
with the same retailer) are given the same price policy. The
analysis in the paper illustrates the potential advantages of
the individualised price policy approach through extensive
simulations using a case study of residential users in a typical
European distribution network, where each of the scenarios
used was based on actual data from network end-users.
It was demonstrated both in the trial results in [16] and in the
results in Section V that the use of global DSM price policies
can cause synchronisation of user demand patterns, reducing
load diversity and creating undesirable “rebound” effects. The
individualised price policy approach proposed in this paper has
advantages over a global policy approach. It was shown that
the individualised price policy can increase the load factor,
and improve voltage and line loading conditions, and reduce
network losses, compared to a global DSM price signal.
The results here are based on trials from a Danish DSO and
extensive simulations using recorded demand data. However,
the actual behaviour of a particular group of customers in
response to a price signal (global or individualised) is complex
and difficult to predict accurately. Therefore it is not possible
to draw general conclusions, which apply to other users across
all regions and market conditions, based on these results.
Despite this, the presented results are informative in that they
illustrate that there are significant problems in using a global
price policy approach for residential DSM, and show that
the proposed individualised price policy approach is able to
resolve these problems and provide operational benefits for the
DSO. There are other potential long-term DSO benefits which
are not assessed in this paper, such as network investment
deferral, and improvement of equipment lifetimes due to re-
duced instances of overloading. One limitation of the approach
is that it does not specifically encourage users to increase their
flexibility. The DSO may wish to offer economic compensa-
tion to encourage users to install more ESS and increase their
flexibility, since this flexibility clearly benefits the DSO in
terms of reducing operational and network investment costs.
A possible approach to providing these incentives would be
to allocate a portion of the projected savings from the deferral
of network investments for this purpose.
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